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 I will use the term “transitional society” for those societies that used to be communist dominated but are1
undertaking a process of democratisation leading into postcommunism.
Srdjan Vrcan, “Torn between tremendous challenges and tormenting responses: Religion in the Nineties2
in  the  a rea  o f fo rmer Yugoslavia”,  ISO RECEA conference, D ecember, 2001 . ,
www.isorecea.org/abstracts.htm
Vjesnik, 18.12.2001 “Intervju sa Srdjanom Vrcanom: ‘Crkva i Vlada spremne su (p)ostati partneri.’3
Sinisa Zrinscak, “Roles, attentes et conflicts: la religion et les Églises dans les societées en transition”,4
Social Compass 49 (4), 2002., pp. 509-521; Srdjan Vrcan,: “The war in ex-Yugoslavia and Religion”,
Social Compass 41 (3), 1994., pp. 413-422.
RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXIV, 2 (April 2004) page 1.
CHURCH IN DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE CIVIL
SOCIETY
By Vedran Horvat
Vedran Horvat is a free lance journalist, publisher and Transitions Online
(www.tol.cz) reporter specialized in migration, social and religious issues in
Zagreb, Croatia. He received his diploma in Sociology and Comparative Croatian
Studies at University of Zagreb and his M.A. at European Regional Master in Human
Rights and Democracy in South East Europe in Sarajevo and Bologna. Also, he is
member of the International Study of Religion in Central and Eastern Europe
Association (ISORECEA).
1. INTRODUCTION
When pope John Paul II, at the beginning of 1990s in his speeches exclaimed that God has
won in the East he probably did not know that only ten years later he will not be able to confirm this
presumed victory. Maybe not even a pyrrhic one, because, the very high expectations about the new
role of religion in countries of postcommunist transition  have not been fulfilled. Many of them have1
not been concretely confirmed by the factual situation, which makes God’s proclaimed victory rather
ambivalent.  To the contrary, in the past few years, the trend of a small but continuous decline of2
religiosity occurred even in countries with a strong traditional religious heritage, like Poland, going
hand in hand with the less than expected rate of de-secularization of society. Also, the announcements
that religion, especially Catholicism, will experience revival inspired by the example of Polish
Catholicism that will be used as an universal model of reviving a sleepy Catholicism in Western
Europe have not been realized.3
The question that arises is, what is the role and place of religion in the period of transition to
democracy and social circumstances which have, in past few years overwhelmed not just Eastern and
Central, but also South Eastern Europe?  “Finally, it is true that the complex and parallel process of
politicization of religion and religionization of politics was very evident. The question is still: what is
the general role of politics in society and in what way can the role of religion be subordinated to
political events or only to the political level of society?”  Religion, suppressed under communist4
regimes eventually could along with the democratic changes became visible and manifest, able to
In some countries (former Yugoslavia) it ended with emphasizing the confessional differences which were5
instrumentalized with the purpose to maintain a conflictual atmosphere.
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develop as a free and equal factor of society. Now, it got the chance to redefine its place in the wider
social context and re-establish new modalities of interaction with other social actors. It is the main task
of this paper to examine these modalities of new perspectives through which religion can find a place
and define a new role for itself in transitional society, especially in the Balkan region. Accordingly,
main issues that will be explored are the separation or disentanglement of church from state and
definition of the role of religion in the overlapping space of political and civil society. Involvement of
the church (or other religious institutions) in political life is still one of not so rare involvement by the
dominant religious institutions into the daily secular reality. Therefore, one part of the paper will be
dedicated to defining the distinctions between social engagement of religion as a part of civil society
and its political involvement that takes us back to the (pre)modern world. But again, the church as a
sum of believers that are part of society cannot be fully independent from it; in some areas mutual
influence cannot be avoided. What kind of relationship between state and church should be established
in order to adequately respond to all democratic, but also religious criteria, is an issue which every
religion must resolve as it seeks mechanisms of communication with different social actors. Religion
continues to be a fact of the highest social and political relevance. Its future depends on the issues to
which it will relate, and these tended to be more profane than sacred in recent times.
In this exploration I will mostly use an analytical, but also a polemical approach to raise new
questions that are affecting religion in all transitional societies.  Religious human rights during the
period of democratic transition are also very important but they will not be included in this work. The
paper will refer to current social science and sociology literature and will be mainly based on views of
eminent authors who researched this particular issue over more than few decades and most of whom
live in transitional countries, such as Tomka, Vrcan, Zrinšak, and Borowik.
Also, it is necessary to emphasize that, respecting differences among the religions of this region and
their approach to the state, this paper will deal generally with the place and role of religious
institutions. However, with a few exceptions, most of the issues will be related to the Christianity.
2. RELIGION IN THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION—FROM  COM M UNISM  TO
POSTCOMMUNISM
Although one could assume that the transition to democracy/free market economy would
bring to society different elements suitable for secularization - or a decrease of religious influence in a
particular society, social processes that took place in post-communist European countries took, at least
in the beginning, a contrary form. To put it clearly and simply, transition began with an increase in
religiosity.  Along with the trend of de-privatization of religion, churches (mostly the dominant ones)5
started to revert to their previous positions from which they would be able to spread their influence in
Zrinscak, op. cit., pp. 509-521.6
Ibid.7
Ibid.8
Ibid.9
Miklos Tomka, “Contradictions of secularism and the preservations of the sacred”, in Laermans, R.,1 0
Wilson, B., Billiet, J. (eds) Secularization and Social Integration. Papers in Honor of Karel Dobbealaere.
(Leuven, Leuven University Press, 1998);  Miklos Tomka,. “Religion, Church, State and Civil Society in
East-Central Europe”, in Borowik, I. (ed) Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe. Krakow,
Nomos, 1999., in Zrinscak,  “Roles, attentes...”
Ibid. Zrinscak, “Roles...”11
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society and fulfill the value vacuum created by the fall of communist regimes. Some authors are trying
to show that for those societies religion is still crucial for the overall functioning of a particular society.
Although the recent war on the territory of ex-Yugoslavia was not a religious one,
the Churches  played a key role both at the symbolic level of maintenance of separate
national identities and on the level of complex social processes. The contradictory
and uncertain nature of transition processes additionally complicated the role of
religion in society and partly prevented its accommodation to new social
circumstances which can be seen in the different roles that religion has to play;
contradictory expectations of the public towards the Church and sharp social conflict
that divide society.6
However, although responsible, the war is just one of the elements that influenced strong re-
appearance of religiosity on transitional social scene. “As transition is a complex process, its
success...relies on interconnected transformation in all domains of social life. The deep contradictions
shown in transition to pluralistic and market oriented society, seriously shaping the transition process
itself, also partly derive from history.”  The term transition is sometimes very ambivalent. “It is not7
certain where the transition countries are really going and, therefore, how long the transition will
last....Political and economic transformation has already been successfully completed in many
countries but still no one wants to declare that the transition is completed.”  Hundreds of millions of8
citizens of new-born democracies across a wide geographical area, from Hungary, the Czech Republic
and Croatia to Kazahstan and Kyrgyzstan experienced in last decade serious and unavoidable
consequences; widening inequality, rising unemployment and poverty, a set of new social problems,
war, etc.9
According to some relevant data (European Values Study in 1999.), there are great differences
in religiosity among the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe manifested in a high
degree of variance between the nations and inapplicability of the modernization thesis, mostly because
of different histories and religious traditions, but also the peculiarities of communist modernization and
other particularities of communist rules.  Accordingly, it must be emphasized that is impossible to10
speak generally of post-communist countries and more than questionable to divide them into the
Catholic and Orthodox countries trying to find similar patterns of religious change. It is very obvious,
due to different reasons, that for some countries the role of religion is still very crucial for the overall
functioning of society, which, however, is rarely consistent with the degree of modernization.11
Ibid.12
Ales Crnic, “The concept of religion in times of transition”, ISORECEA conference, Zagreb, December,13
2001., www.isorecea/abstracts.htm
Zrinscak, “Religion and society in tension: Social and legal status of religious communities in Croatian14
transition circumstances”, in Richardson, J. (ed.), Regulating Religions. Examples around the Globe,
(Chicago: Kluwer Academic Press,  Chicago, 2003).
Coleman, John. A.: “A limited state and vibrant society: Christianity and Civil Society “ in Civil Society15
and Government, ed. by Nancy L. Rosenblum and Robert C. Post, (Princeton, 2002), p. .227.
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Nevertheless, it still posses the attributes of a very relevant social fact, that is  “highly connected with
some basic social needs, but also some serious ideological and political disputes.”12
Turbulent and chaotic transitional period from monolithic communism to liberal democracy,
pluralism and market economy, with the lack of legal acts concerning religiosity, was, and in some
places still is, even for the Church, a right moment to act in the direction of reverting to previous
positions. “After the fall of the Berlin wall, the majority churches often try to attain the dominant
positions which they occupied before the rise of communism and socialism, furthermore, this suddenly
becomes a re-opened spiritual area of extreme interest for new religious movements.”  However, over13
the years, in most of transitional countries more or less suitable legal acts have been enacted and the
intensity of de-secularization was not so strong as one may expect. De-secularization was not
penetrating like it was expected into the ‘molecular level’ of the social tissue, it stayed more on the
level of manifested social events. “As the Hungarian sociologist Miklos Tomka elaborated in many of
his papers, the alleged secularization process was replaced in 80’s by the revitalization of religion,
which was a crucial precondition of the process of regeneration of society against the totalitarian
state.”14
Now, in some more developed transition countries, the state and the church are already
signing the divorce of the  new ‘postcommunist’ marriage, but at the same time, promising to each
other that they will stay official partners in solving issues concerning the common good and benefit of
society. Re-establishing their relationship is, maybe, the most important issue for solving all the
problems related to the place of religion in the new-born democracies.
But the way to this particular moment was sometimes very hard. Till then
the churches were faced with the dilemmas of being situated in authoritarian
dictatorships of totalitarian regimes that restricted not only the liberty of the churches
but more fundamental human liberties. Often...they served as the only institutional
carriers of (or protective umbrella for) any oppositional civil society. A rich
comparative sociological literature exists that documents the Christian church’s role
as  midwives to a reborn (or first born in some cases) civil society in the transition
from dictatorships.15
A few years before the fall of communism, during 1980’s, the communist power elite in some
more developed countries (such as Slovenia) agreed on a division of power with the church following
the pattern, economic field to the establishment, morality to the Church. Now, “the Church still applies
this ‘historical compromise” with the communist regime, who had thus unintentionally, especially after
S. Hribar,  “Church as the Criteria of Truth,” p.15 in Rizman, Rudolf M.: “The Radical Right Politics in16
Slovenia”, in State Building in the Balkans,  p. 332.
A. Agh,, “Neo-traditionalism and Populism from Above in East-Central Europe (manuscript), p.10, in17
Rudolf M. Rizman,  ”The Radical Right Politics in Slovenia”., p.332
Vjesnik, 25 January 2003. “Prilog Panorama, intervju sa dr. Srdjanom Vrcanom: ‘Religija danas svoju18
sansu mora naci u proslosti’ [Today religion can find its chance in the past].
Roberto Papini, “Christianity and Democracy in Europe” in Christianity and Democracy in Global19
Context, John Witte Jr. (ed) Boulder, 1993., p  48. 
Ibid.20
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its fall and during the introduction of democracy, given the church license to widen it’s moral
‘sovereignty’ over the body politic and the state itself.”  In some transition countries (such as Croatia),16
it still happens that Church speaks publicly about political decisions of the state and penetrates into the
field of their jurisdiction, not as a spokesman of civil society, but for itself. At the same time, the
“Church acted very pragmatically in the transition with the slogan ‘Our past is our future.’”  It seems17
that this direction might be interesting for defining the future place of religion in society. Very recently,
one of the eminent scholars and theorists in the field of religion, Croatian sociologist Srdjan Vrcan
confirmed this perspective almost with the same words:  “It’s chance today, religion must find in the
past.”  However, the role of religion before the beginning of the transitional period also wasn’t clear18
enough. The papal encyclical, Centesimus Annus, is, for example, dedicated to the problem of the post-
communist countries with the aim to minimize the traumas in the arduous transition to a political
democracy and a market economy.  
Democratic institutions that have been set up in countries where, among other things,
the great majority of the population has no experience of Western democracy need
the support of a structured society, but they lack, in every sector, an entrepreneurial
culture that can stimulate its growth. Faced with an extraordinary vacuum of faith,
moral apathy and generalized fragmentation of society - communism’s worst legacy -
only a new culture of hope, the Pope would say a new solidarity, can provide the
basis for a democracy capable of withstanding the risks of disintegration and social
violence, the resurgence of old and new nation crisis and economic chaos.”19
However, before elaborating the new role of religion in transitional society one should be
reminded that in the recent past, “the Church’s relationship with democracy was for a long time
conflictual.”  Related to this issue, it is not surprising that totalitarian systems often reinforce one20
another. The pre-war (Second World War) structures of the Catholic Church, especially those that were
patriarchal and authoritarian, appeared again slightly modified in communism as a form of a new,
secular religion. Their convertibility confirmed again, during the transitional period when they have
changed the labels and became believers again.  It remains a question whether democracy and
Christianity as two different models can be compatible enough to successfully cooperate within
society. Some authors think that it is possible, even necessary.
Christianity and democracy complement each other. Christianity provides democracy
with the system of beliefs that integrates its concerns for liberty and responsibility,
individuality and community. Democracy provides Christianity with a system of
Witte (ed), Christianity and Democracy in Global Context, p. 12.21
Ibid.p.59, (On its way to liberal democracy and market economy, each country in transition deals with22
attempts of dominant (state) religions to participate in political, (not civil!) society. 
Leslie Holmes, Postcommunism: An Introduction, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997., p. 286, ERMA reader23
for Second Cluster (Democracy)
Paul Mojzes, “Religious Human Rights in Postcommunist Balkan Countries”, “Religious Human Rights24
in Global Perspective”, Johan D. van der Vyver and John Witte Jr. (ed.), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
Hague, 1996., p. 270.
Ibid., p. 271.25
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government that balances its concerns for human dignity and depravity, social
pluralism and progress.”21
Some authors think that in transitional countries “what is needed above all is increased
educational and cultural cooperation, to help democracy put down firm roots in the consciousness of
the people. In some countries in particular,” Papini stresses, “the church can do a great deal to
encourage a spirit of solidarity...although it must avoid the temptation to reassert its claim to temporal
power”.  22
Hand in hand with democratic changes,
the role of the church has in some important ways been enhanced. Citizens
throughout the post-communist world are now legally free to practice
religion....Legislation has been enacted in several countries that permits religious
education in schools. It is worth noting that the church has in some cases not merely
been relativized as a religious organization, but has also become even more active
politically.”23
Nevertheless great importance must be given to respecting of religious human rights which appeared
with the collapse of communistic regimes. 
One of the characteristics of the Great Transformation was the rehabilitation and
renaissance of religion in all former Communist countries...The basic characteristic
of the vastly improved situation in regard to religious liberty is that, with the
exception of Albania, it was not manifested primarily by massive change in
legislation but by radical improvement in the behavior of governmental agencies
toward religious communities and individuals. . . But it turned out that these
expectations or predictions were premature.24
The reason for disappointment with such an optimistic expectations was simple. In case that
traditional ethnoreligious identification did not bring the country to a war, like in the states on territory
of former Yugoslavia, which was sometimes stimulated even by the leaders of religious institutions,
one could observe another, less brutal but nevertheless non-democratic behavior. 
The historically dominant religion or church of a region sought the restoration of all
of its lost privileges from the precommunist era and, considering other religious
communities as rivals, sought to influence state authorities to limit the rights of other
religious communities and of non-believers....Thus, currently one can observe an
area-wide struggle between the dominant church or religion that wishes to restrict the
activities of rival denominations and the numerous old and new religious groups that
are threatened by the prospect of monopoly by the dominant national church. 25
Ibid., p. 272.26
Zrinscak, “Roles, attentes...”27
Ibid.28
Mojzes, op. cit.,, p. 283.29
Coleman,  “Christianity and Civil Society”, p. 227.30
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And still, it is an everyday experience of common people that “many representatives of dominant
churches do not fully understand the concept of religious liberty; perhaps not surprisingly, because
historically they have not experienced such arrangements since they knew only the privileged and
oppressive conditions.”  “According to its overall social role, the Church therefore has been given26
some new tasks which are partly inconsistent with the need for adjusting to new social
circumstances”.  But they are very often hard task and challenges hard to respond to. “Contradictory27
expectations which state public institutions are not able to fulfill, and which have even risen in recent
years, particularly among pauperized parts of society, or simply numerous ‘losers’ of the war and
transitional process, are in many cases directed towards the Catholic Church”.28
Surely, the most important issue which is necessary to understand regarding the place of
religion in the future of transitional countries is the relationship between the religious institutions (we
shall call them churches) and the state (government) which has been radically changed in last decade.
Most of the transitional countries inherited the rigid model of separation between state and church
present during the communist period which they have transformed into a new social pact between the
two elites.
3 . THE STATE AND CHURCH RELATIONSHIP AND THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
A true separation of church and state seems to be understandable from the
perspective both of some church leaders and activists of the dominant national
church as well as political leaders. The impulse is to introduce legislation that would
place obstacles upon the work of various religious groups--almost always minorities-
-and attempts are made to restrain and perhaps even to eliminate them from the
scene. Tremendously powerful forces are at work in all Balkan states to revert to an
historical arrangement where the dominant religious community is privileged by the
state while some of the other religious communities are hindered in their work.29
Not long ago, some scholars noticed a kind of chaos in postcommunist Balkan countries in the
supposed and not very successful attempts to separate the church from the state. However, it will take
time that church becomes a “separately institutionalized, quasi-autonomous realm of civil society as a
‘free public space’”.30
To summarize the past, we can say that the repression of religion in communism in the field of
Church and State relations was even expressed by the notion of their separation. For example, on the
territory of the former Yugoslavia this process was officially stated in the first Constitution of former
Yugoslavia in 1946 and was repeated in all new versions, usually presented as a modern principle,
applied worldwide. Even France, the only European country with a strict separation model, did not
have such a public treatment of religion. Religion was treated as an unprogressive social fact, very
Zrinscak, “Roles, attentes...”31
“Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective”, p. 203.32
Coleman, “A limited state and vibrant society: Christianity and Civil Society“, p. 234.33
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often masked with the expression that it belongs only to the private sphere. On the other hand, the
factual political treatment of religion, visible in the fact that the Church was only social institution not
completely controlled by the authorities, easily added political meaning to different social acts of the
Church, which also behaved in that manner. A basically hostile relation that can be attributed to whole
communist period can be divided in two phases; severe repression and a more liberal way with
improved opportunities for public action.31
The Church and State relationship is maybe the most relevant and significant issue related to
the new position of religion in transitional society, and therefore, it must be solved. In spite of that, it
still represents a great obstacle to many re-born democracies because it can be a test and the result
might be a failure. Recent surveys show that in most of the transitional countries people still have
strong confidence in the Church as institution, much more than in the public and state institutions.
Additionally, belonging to a particular, dominant church is still one of the markers not only nationality,
but cultural identity in general and it is expected that state undertake measures in order to protect it. At
the same time it must not discriminate against other religious communities and violate their right to
equality.
The fact that the state denies exclusivity to any specific religion by granting equal
rights to all religions should not be seen as a disparagement of the religious message
itself. After all, it is exactly this freedom that enables all religions to claim their
message to be absolute. But the state as the ‘homeplace of all citizens” has to
guarantee freedom of belief and religious practice to all citizens and also has to
protect their liberty and equality from being threatened or jeopardized by other
religious communities.32
With the fall of communism it happened that churches, till then rigidly separated from the
state, re-married them for a short moment. But after that, and this process still lasts, they signed the
divorce and substituted this kind of the pact with creating a new, partnership relationship. But where
exactly should be boundaries between state and church in (post)modern democratic society? When is it
allowed for the church to enter the public sphere and not be accused of interference with state affairs?
Jose Casanova, drawing mainly on modern Catholic case studies, has argued, to the
contrary, that there is a proper role for public religion in modernity. Casanova notes
that from a normative perspective of modernity, religion may enter the public sphere
and assume a public form only if it accepts the sanctity of the principle of freedom of
conscience. It can also do so only if it does accept some legitimate differentiation of
spheres in modern society (but differentiation did not mean total autonomy.)33
Casanova’s arguments speak on behalf of complete disentanglement of church from state and
political parties. According to him, there are three conditions under which religion may enter the public
sphere with legitimacy; when it want to protect not only its own freedom but all modern freedoms and
rights (including the very right of democratic civil society to exist against an absolutist, authoritarian
Casanova, Jose, “Public Religions in the Modern World”, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.),34
pp. 40-66 in Coleman, John. A.: “A limited state and vibrant society: Christianity and Civil Society“, 
Casanova, op. cit.,  p. 65.35
Zrinscak,  “Religion and society in tension..”36
Heckel, Martin, “The Impact of religious rules on public life in Germany”, in “Religious Human Rights37
in Global Perspective”, p. 192.
Ibid., p.193.38
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state); to question the absolutized lawful autonomy of the secular spheres and their claims to be
organized in accordance to principles of functional differentiation without regard to ethical or moral
considerations; and to protect the traditional life-world from administrative or juridical state
penetration.  Or, as Casanova stresses: “What I call the ‘deprivatization’ of modern religion is the34
process whereby religion abandons its assigned place in the private sphere and enters the
undifferentiated sphere of civil society to take part in the ongoing process of contestation, discursive
legitimation and redrawing of the boundaries.”  35
Although I will write about the role of religion in the context of civil society, here I would like
to give one of the definitions of deprivatization, a process immanent to transition.  In developed
western democracies there are three existing models of church and state relationship; a) the state
church model (Finland, Greece, Great Britain) that is preferring a dominant religious community; b)
separation and cooperation model, (Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain) where church is separated from the
state, but not from the society which implies that religious communities have some social tasks to do
and c)rigid separation model, the laicity or secular concept (France). It remains yet to be seen which
model will prevail in transitional countries. Some of them decided to follow the well-known model of
mutual co-operation of Church and State. For example, the agreements that Croatia signed are very
similar to Italian and Spanish ones and they produce several types of social and legal status of different
religious communities.36
However, with the separation of the state and church, one could think that it is assumed that
the church must stay outside of the society, i.e. be passive in regard to impacting society, according to
a ‘deal’ with the state. In transitional social circumstances marked with so many difficulties and
anomalies, it is hard to believe that the church will not try to be or remain active. But different
interpretations referring to life, the world and truth between state and church sometimes can become
the source of incoherence. 
For example:  “The secular and neutral law of the state is concerned with the exterior
regulation of cultural and social issues without considering the theological question of ‘truth’. Within
the church, however, the law has always to be measured against its duty to the truth of divine
revelation and to the preaching of the word of God.”  But reasons not only  related to the ‘truth’ can be37
the source of the conflict between the state and the churches. The legal powers of both church and state
compete and thus create conflicts and problems of loyalty...there are differences between religious
convictions and secular values (duties) as well as tensions between church and state and their
respective orders.38
“Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective”, p.  252.39
 Ibid. p. 199.40
Balazs Shanda, Religious freedom in Hungarian Law (1988.), Ph.D. Dissertation, Budapest, in Religious41
Human Rights in Global Perspective, p. 253.
Orlin, T., “Religious Pluralism and Freedom of Religion”, in the Strength of Diversity, Dordrecht 1992.,42
p. 107 in Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective, p. 253.
Kerr, A.Donal (ed), “Religion, state and ethnic identity”, (New York, NY University Press, 1992), p. 13.43
Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective”, p. 200.44
Ibid. p. 201.45
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One could agree with the opinion that close cooperation between state and church would
result in negative consequences. “The basis of the principle [of the separation] lies in the fact that the
state and various churches fulfill different social functions, which, if conjoined, would harm both of
them.” So, why would be separation be so important ?39
Separation brings about emancipation. It frees the churches from the state
dominance. It frees the state from denominational tutelage. It frees the individual
person from the bounds of confessionalism and of church establishment...The
concept of separation protects the churches from being incorporated into the
organizational structure of the state. It keeps the state from accepting a religious
confession as its own.40
Separation of the state and church implies the kind of neutrality in which the “state does not identify
itself with any of the churches, refrains from interfering activities of the churches and does not ensure
privileges for any of them.”41
According to the so-called lemon-test which was developed by the U.S.Supreme Court (1971)
to determine whether a law was made in the spirit of neutrality, “a challenged law or policy must meet
three requirements to satisfy the constitution: a) the legislation should have a secular goal; b) it should
not provide advantages to any of the religions nor should it ban any of its activities; c) there should be
no entanglement between the state and church.”   But still, some authors claim that “all the case42
studies show a desire of the state to control the religion of non-dominant ethnic groups what implies
that they protect the dominant one.”43
Today, one might agree with the thesis that the modern state has overcome the traditional
liberal program of strict separation of state and society. In other words, it has been substantially
modified, (which we will explain in the section related to the civil society). Nowadays, “church and
state must adopt a precise and inward sharing of competencies and responsibilities: whenever ‘common
issues’ are concerned, the state has to confine itself to the secular and the church to the spiritual aspects
of those issues”  in order to efficiently solve the problem. Related to this, the concept of separation of44
church and state cannot be understood “as obsolete in these new fields of social and cultural
interaction. Rather, it is newly realized in a precise separation of competences in the context of
coordination and cooperation.”  For example, “catholic social thought is pluralistic in its insistence on45
the limited service character of the state. The state exists as an instrument to promote justice and
liberty. The ends of the public order entrusted primarily or essentially to the state’s nurturance of the
Coleman,  “A limited State and Vibrant Society: Christianity and Civil Society“, p. 237.46
Ibid.p. 234 (Elsthain, Jaean Bethke, “Relationship of Public to Private”, The New Dictionary of Catholic47
Social Thought, ed. Judith Dwyer (Collegeville, Minn: Liturgical Press, 1994.), p. 796.
Coleman, op. cit., p. 233.48
Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective”, p. 254.49
Coleman, op. cit., p. 224.50
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common good are fourfold: public peace, public morality, welfare and justice, freedom of people.”  At46
the same time, it “contains a strong animus against the view that the public sphere is synonymous with
the government or the formal polity of the society.”  According to classic Catholic distinction between47
state and civil society--John Courtney Murray being their representative--“the state’s true care for
religion is restricted to its care for freedom of religion. It’s care consists in the state’s recognition of the
church’s claim, under the rubric of libertas ecclesial, for immunity in the juridical order in matters
touching religion.”48
A democratic state, however, would behave inappropriately if it were indifferent to
religion....It may also, consistent with the principle of neutrality, provide certain
forms of support to churches. A democratic state has many duties in which it can
correctly rely on the activities of the churches as partners. Culture, education and
health care, for example, are areas in which, in Europe at least, the prevailing
structures have long relied and will continue to rely on both state and church
support...Such support is (now from the state’s perspective) compatible with the
principle of state neutrality, however, only if the state does not differentiate among
the different churches in furnishing its support. If support is given, it must be given
indiscriminately to all churches.49
According to some authors, successful separation of the church from state depends also on the
behavior of  leading people in religious circles. “Even those Christians who held (or those few who
continue to hold) some variant of a position supporting a state-sponsored church would still generally
appeal also to a version of a doctrine of the ‘freedom’ of the church from too much governmental
control or entanglement.”50
The future of this relationship at the moment is not defined. It exists as a possibility in the gap
between the old liberal model that supposed state neutrality and incompetence with the issues related to
the ‘truth’ and ‘soul’, which did not allow the state to interfere with religious convictions of their
citizen and the new, ethnoreligous one, where the state prefers that religion which is part of national
and cultural identity and according to that key, has an active participatory role in discriminating against
the other religious communities.
4. RELIGION BETWEEN STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Social changes that came with the transition placed religion into new social circumstances and
new established relationships among social actors. Churches found themselves in the gap between
‘being instrumentalized by the politics’ and  ‘playing an active role as one of the members of civil
society,’ between political involvement and social engagement. Very often confused with the new rules
of the ‘transition games’ they sometimes did not let the temptations to go away and they have made a
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Ernst Troeltsch, “The Social Theory of the Christian Churches”, vol.1, trans Olive Wyon, (New York,54
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certain agreement with the pro-national governments in order to re-attain their previous positions.
However, there were some individuals from church circles who were more aware that the church
belongs to the civil society rather than the field of politics. One of the most important elements of
“transformational changes after 1989 was the differentiation of civil society and forming of political
society. That revolutionary changes required answer from the church and its hierarchy, especially
because they were oriented more to the past then to the future.”  This particular position we already51
touched upon.
4.1. RELIGION AS A PART OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
Is it possible that today churches can help in building civil society without becoming
politicized or submerged in a secular world? In order to preserve their role, they are becoming a
participant of a special form of civil society: a ‘contrast’ society. Only the churches institutionalized in
the appropriate way are capable to accommodate to civil society and become part of it.  It is important52
to remind that, during communist dictatorships, most of the churches were the matrix of civil society,
“the only institutions of non-governmental type”  during communism.53
Long ago, a famous sociologist of religion, Ernst Troeltsch 
....argued as much when he contended that the early church, in demanding to be
conceived of as a separate sphere whose authority was derivative from God and
conscience before God and not from the state, made its main contribution to social
theory to anchor a novum  in history: ‘free spaces’ in society that did not derive their
legitimacy directly from the state. 54
According to that, there are authors that claim “that the church itself flourishes best and most freely in
societies which, more generally, allow free markets and freedom of speech, assembly, petition and
mobility.”  Postconciliar Catholic social thought shares and even champions the same point of view55
when it confirms what Casanova calls a “new form of ‘public religion in the modern world,’ civil
society that is not seen as some neutral private sphere, but rather as one in alignment with the state.”56
But still, one cannot resist agreeing that the church is in, but not really fully of civil society, because its
authority derives from God and not from the state or the associational nexus of civil society. Because
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of that, it doesn’t usually thinks of itself as just one other free association within civil society, totally
equivalent to the other free associations.57
In spite of that, Casanova stresses, “although the church in no way exhausts civil society, it
tends to belong in that realm rather than the state”.  Nevertheless, “civil society offers a zone of58
freedom, spontaneity, creativity, a grassroots anchoring of ‘belonging’. It remains the primary locale
for the anchoring of virtue. In point of fact, moral traditions are strongly rooted in the religious
institutions and the neutral state cannot easily promulgate a unitary theory of virtue.”  But, ironically,5 9
the voluntary, dispersed and free-choice mechanisms of civil society are not able to guarantee the
fulfillment of fundamental human needs or fair distributive justice.60
But, another question arises. The extent to which an understanding of separation of church and
state promotes or restricts the church’s role as a mediating structure in civil society is more than
questionable. The realm, the scope that is allowed to the church for action in education, welfare, health
or media is yet to be decided in each transitional country.  However, “it is widely expected that the61
church will and should speak on a wide range of social issues. Yet, there is a kind of gap between
expectations that, for example, the Church speaks on unemployment, poverty, even abortion and the
somewhat lower level of acceptance of the opinion that the church is really giving adequate answers to
social problems.”  62
Yet, there still remains the question, what kind of [political] power does Church have to have
in order to achieve some significant results? To do that, Church must enter the political domain, then
be able to see a connection between current social problems and the development of democracy and
civil society, and eventually, to neutralize possible political interpretations of their actions.  The style63
of the church’s influence “upon the culture and society changed after the Second Vatican Council but”,
some authors still think that “there is no evidence that its ambitions toward having some legitimate
access and voice and influence upon the quality and morality of public life have in any way
diminished.”64
4.2. RELIGION AS A PART OF POLITICAL SOCIETY
During the decade of transition, almost every church or socially significant religious
community in postcommunist countries found itself confronted with the temptation: to be used by the
political order and to gain some political power for itself. As we already know, most of them simply
Zrinscak, op.cit.65
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could not resist. Obviously, what happened is the result of overlapping between religion and politics,
and creating new social processes that some authors called the ‘politization of religion’ or
‘religionization of politics.’ The same pattern is repeated on the national level, “the sacred is
nationalizing; the national is secularizing”.  Many religious communities became systems of65
interpretation of national ‘truths.’
But before we analyze this let us remember some contradictory influences on the relations
between religion and nation. It is well known that communists tried to suppress religion. “The
connection between religion and traditional parts of society was additionally supported by the fact that
the ruling elite was dominantly atheistic. Due to that, the Church was only institution not directly
controlled by the state and which could express opposition to the communist regime.”  Also, one66
could agree that “The crucial role that religion played in the process of regeneration of society in
opposition to the communist rule was marked by rising religiosity in some countries even since
1978.”67
Crucial challenges that happened to religion during the decade of transition, especially on the
territory of former Yugoslavia, according to Vrcan are following:
a) the political mobilization of religious resources of meaning and tradition and greater
visibility of religious symbolism to serve political purposes of dominant political strategies;
b) a peculiar religious legitimacy having been given by the respective religious institutions to
the dominant political strategies of clearly nationalist orientation;
c) the religious revival in the nineties in the area but in the wake of the tidal wave of
ethnification of politics and politization of the ethnic;
d) the revival being supported by a fusion of nationalization of the sacred and sacralization of
the nation culminating in political instrumentalization of religion and religious instrumentalization of
politics;
e) a radical change in the social position of religion showing inclination to establish as much
as possible the traditional centrality of religious institutions within the framework of the new
functioning social system and new systemic institutional arrangements as well as the cultural totality of
religion as the overarching cultural and symbolic system.68
What must also be stressed is the fact that church in many post-communist European
countries, in order to strengthen the public role of religion and bring it back to the social scene, used
political and not those proclaimed channels. To put it in other words, they have collaborated with the
state, very often pro-nationalistically oriented. Nevertheless, the political potential of the churches as a
social force as well as being a significant part of society, both political and civil, must not be neglected.
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It was more than clear when the Polish Catholic Church, embodied in the social movement
‘Solidarnost’ contributed to the fall of the Communist regime in Poland. However, transitional
countries sometimes confront themselves with other forces in Catholic Church which are not so far
from taking over the official role of government. Not very long ago, ‘secularized’ Slovenia was in the
position of confronting some strong influences from some religious circles. “Although Slovenia
introduced a parliamentary democracy and conducted free elections, the Catholic Church still claims to
be not only the representative but also the morally legitimate spokesperson of the Slovenian nation.”69
In this case, it was more than clear that the Church represent a particular, in this case right-wing
political option.
It is well known that during the war period, both the Orthodox, and Catholic Churches were
related to the separated national identities involved in the war. But, in the post-war period in former
Yugoslavia, with some recent events viewed analytically, we can see that Churches still, or perhaps
even to a greater degree, mark themselves as national and that it is hard for them to abandon certain
political positions (e.  g. the Catholic Church in Croatia).
Religious appeals to identity and solidarity values interacted with political parties
and the recasting of political cultures. Wishing to play again a predominant role,
official religious institutions sought to establish strong links with the state and
territory. Contributing significantly to re-legitimate power in historical and
metaphysical terms, they emphasized the holy and transcendental dimension of the
nation. This approach was particularly marked in the case of Orthodox Christianity.70
It seems sometimes that these churches are far from the proclaimed positions of official
churches that “direct political involvement is ruled out; the church has no special political gifts and
such involvement is deemed harmful to the broader ministry of the church. But a socially activist role
for the church is legitimate and encouraged.”71
With the “mixing of the sacred and the profane, and using religion as a mark of identity,
nationalism established new sources of legitimation, while perpetuating discrimination and increasing
conflict.”  This direction can be understandable for young democracies which did not have enough72
time to build a strong infrastructure because “nationalism is often the only thing that can fill the
vacuum in states where civic associations are weak and the main political institutions lack prestige due
to chronic malfunctioning.”73
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The historical and social involvement of the Churches in transitional societies are very deep
and their notions are closely intertwined, and very probably, the same situation will remain in the
future. Social processes are still very closely connected with politics, and religion very often can find
itself as politically meaningful. On the contrary, if we would like to artificially separate religion,
society and politics, it would mean that believers cannot involve themselves in political life. As such,
religion is still one of the arenas where democracy can be tested and verified. Social tensions can also
be interpreted religiously and some churches have a free field to act concerning socially relevant
issues.  Outside of  politics, of course...74
CONCLUSION
The main aim of this paper was to show how turbulent social processes in postcommunistic
transitional societies influence religion and how religion responds to these new challenges. The claims
of authors presented in this paper have shown that religion sometimes finds many obstacles on it’s way
to re-establish new relations with the state on the one, and the newborn civil society, on the other hand,
and, at the same time, to remain adherence to democratic principles, sometimes incoherent with its
hierarchical and rigid structures. It has been shown that many years of suppression by communist
regimes and liberation connected with strong ethnoreligious identifications did too much damage to
religious communities. 
Today, one can see that they have few tasks to complete in order to have a clear starting point
and a foundation for dialogue with other social actors. Disentanglement of church from state and all
sorts of political behavior; respect for religious human rights and participating in the building of civil
society are the most important among them. Nevertheless, turbulent social circumstances that follow
transition do not work on behalf of neutralizing the close links of religion to nationalism. And this is
one of the possible directions in which religion might go, warn some of the authors. Religious
identification with ethnic and national forms of identity derived from history, in the past, is a possible
starting point for maintenance of religion in society. However, in spite of that, religion still can
contribute to society, under the condition that it has dealt with satisfactorily with all the challenges of
modernity.  But, “tensions between tradition and memory on the one hand, and the modernity on the75
other, are not sufficient to negate the continuing need for referring to tradition,”  which is, in the case76
of some transitional countries, still an everyday reality. 
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